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Notes
THE DEFINITION OF FIXTURE IN ARTICLE 9 OF
THE U.C.C.
The article 9fixture rules, lacking a workable dmfntion as to when a chattel
becomes afixture, have caused much controversy with respect to the priori issue
between real estate morigagees and chattel secured creditors. This Note examines
the importance ofafixture dinition under article 9 and evaluates the practical dff-
culties of leaving such a definition to state law. After reviewing various proposed
solutions, the Note concludes that by focusing on the priority rules of article 9for
handling conflicting claims by secured parties the problem of fixture classification
can be avoided
INTRODUCTION
THE LIFE of the law is language. Justice Holmes recognized
this premise when he wrote that "[a] word is not a crystal, trans-
parent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used."' The use of the term "fixture" in
Article 9 of the Uiniform Commercial Code2 exemplifies how the
uncritical use of language shapes the law.
The term fixture is used primarily in property law in real estate
conveyancing, taxation, and the public condemnation of land3 to
describe those chattels which have become, through more or less
permanent attachment, part of the realty.4 In the context of article
9, fixture designates a category of collateral used to secure financ-
ing agreements.5 Article 9 distinguishes between movable, tangi-
ble collateral, termed "goods," and intangible collateral such as
accounts and copyrights.6 Fixtures, as distinguished from goods,
are "hybrid goods" sharing "characteristics of both real and per-
1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). See generally R. SAMEK, THE LEGAL
POINT OF VIEW (1974).
2. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -507.
3. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.1 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
4. Id. §§ 19.13-.14.
5. "Collateral is property subject to a 'security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c). A
security interest is an interest in property or fixtures which secures payment or performance
of an obligation. Id. § 1-201(37). A security interest is created by a "security agreement"
between a "debtor" and a "secured party." Id. § 9-105(t)(1), (d), (m).
6. Id. §§ 9-105(1)(h), -106.
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sonal property."7
Whether a particular item is a fixture under article 9 is often a
difficult question,8 which the U.C.C. drafters left for state resolu-
tion.9 A fixture under article 9 is generally an item of personal
property which, through affixation or adaptation to real property,
or by the intent of the owner, has become part of the real prop-
erty, but which may be removed and again become personal
property. '0
This Note examines article 9's use of the term fixture and sug-
gests that, far from being the "skin of a living thought,"II the term
has become a cloak masking the priority issue between real estate
mortgagees and chattel secured creditors. This Note first reveals
that under article 9, characterization of collateral as a fixture has
important consequences, since it determines the manner of
perfecting security interests and the priority rules governing the
interests of debtors and creditors in the collateral. 2 This Note
then concludes that state law, given the task of defining fixture
under article 9, is inadequate to draw the distinction between
goods, fixtures, and real estate.' 3 Finally, this Note reviews vari-
ous proposed solutions to the fixture problem and suggests that
article 9 can provide a better law of secured transactions by elimi-
nating the fixture classification and focusing instead on the prior-
ity rules for resolving the claims of competing secured parties.14
I. FIXTURES IN ARTICLE 9
In the context of article 9, it is important to determine whether
the collateral at issue is a fixture. The classification of collateral as
a good or a fixture determines the method of perfecting the secur-
ity interest 5 and the applicable rules governing the priority of
claims of competing secured creditors for that collateral. Addi-
7. W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 49 (1978).
8. See notes 64-85 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
10. In the words of Professor Warren, a fixture is "realty with a chattel past and the
fear of a chattel future." Gordon, Credit Sales ofInstalled Equprment-The Uniform Com-
mercial Code's Uneasy Trce Between Realty and Chattel Financing Interests, 64 Nw. L.
REV. 651, 651 n.l (1970).
11. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. at 425.
12. See notes 15-63 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 64-85 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 89-146 infra and accompanying text.
15. Perfection gives a security interest priority over an unperfected security interest,
subsequent lien creditors, and, most importantly, a trustee in bankruptcy. Perfection in-
creases the probability that before third parties extend credit, they will receive notice that
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tionally, classification of collateral as a fixture or realty determines
whether the secured transaction provisions of the U.C.C. or the
state's real estate mortgage laws apply. 6 Creditors acting on a
belief that their collateral is a chattel may lose their security inter-
est if a court decides that the collateral is a fixture.17
Article 9 provides special rules for perfecting security interests
in fixtures. In general, a security interest in goods is perfected by
filing a financing agreement with the Secretary of State for the
state where the collateral is located.' 8 If the collateral is a fixture,
a fixture filing must be prepared and filed in the real estate records
of the county where the fixture is located.'
The priority which fixture secured creditors have over other
creditors is determined by the special priority rules of section
9-313 which differ from the priority rules governing other kinds of
collateral. Two kinds of priority rules are provided in section
9-313. One set of rules applies to fixtures in general, and the other
rules provide exceptions to these general rules. By focusing on
particular kinds of fixtures, these latter priority rules are actually
modifications of the general definition of fixture in section
9-313(l)(a).
The general rules first provide that perfected security interests
in fixtures prevail over the interests of mortgagees of the land to
which the fixtures are attached when the fixture filing is made
before the mortgage is recorded.20 Second, if the interest in the
the collateral is subject to prior superior claims. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 918-19 (2d ed. 1980).
16. U.C.C. § 9-104(j).
17. See e.g., In re Collier, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1076 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (creditor per-
fected an interest in a "ten h.p. V.0. oil fired burner" as a fixture, but court held that the
burner was "equipment," thereby leaving the creditor unsecured).
18. U.C.C. § 9-302 provides a blanket filing requirement, subject to certain excep-
tions. The mechanics of filing are provided for in §§ 9-401 to -408.
19. In addition to the information contained in a financing agreement, a fixture filing
must contain a description of the real estate to which the fixture is attached, recite that the
financing agreement is to be filed in the real estate records, and show the name of an
owner of record of the real estate if the debtor does not have an interest of record. Id.
9-313(1)(b), -402(5).
20. Id. § 9-313(4)(b) provides:
[When] the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of
the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any
conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the
debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real
estate.
Id. In the words of one commentator, "Whoever gets there first, be he fixture filer or real
estate interest, wins. To the swift goes the prize." T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 913[A]13] (1978).
1981]
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fixtures is a purchase money security interest,2 it prevails over a
real estate mortgage if the fixture filing is made before the goods
become fixtures or within ten days thereafter,22 unless the mort-
gage is a construction mortgage.23 This second requirement is
"designed to protect the purchase money security interest in a
fixture from prior real estate interests."'24 Subsequent interests
would be protected by the central rule of section 9-313(4)(b). 2
The general rules accord with the principle of article 9 that the
first recorded interest prevails over all others, and the general ex-
ception to that principle for purchase money security interests.26
There are several other priority rules which exempt certain
fixtures from the general rules. "Ordinary building materials in-
corporated into an improvement on land" may never be the sub-
ject of a security interest under article 9, because they are deemed
to be realty.27 "[Rieadily removable factory or office machines or
readily removable replacements of domestic applicances" also are
exempt from the special filing requirements for fixtures. 28 Addi-
tionally, if the debtor has a right to remove the fixture-for exam-
ple, a tenant installs a fixture and the lease permits its removal
when the lease expires--the fixture secured creditor prevails over
21. A purchase money security interest arises when the seller retains an interest in the
collateral to secure part or all of its purchase price or to secure a loan which was made to
finance the purchase of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-107.
22. Id. § 9-313(4)(a) provides:
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting interest of
an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where (a) the security interest is a
purchase money security interest, the interest of the encumbrancer or owner arises
before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is perfected by a fixture
filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten days thereafter, and the
debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real
estate.
23. Id. § 9-313(6) provides:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to subsec-
tions (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures
before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refi-
nance a construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as
the construction mortgage.
24. T. QUINN, supra note 20.
25. A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting inter-
est of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where. . . the security interest
is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is
of record, the security interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a prede-
cessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor has an interest of
record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate. . ..
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(b).
26. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 1058.
27. U.C.C. § 9-313(2).
28. Id. § 9-313(4)(c).
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the mortgagee even if the fixture security interest is unperfected. z9
In the first draft of the present section 9-313, these rules were part
of the definition of fixture, but to make the definition easier to
read, the rules were made priority rules in the final draft.30 Thus,
the term fixture, which the Code purported to define by reference
to state law,31 actually is defined in part by the priority rules of
section 9-313.
In light of the different treatment accorded fixtures and other
collateral, one would expect the U.C.C. to have defined fixture
carefully. The opposite, however, is true. One of the drafters of
the current version of article 9 remarked that the U.C.C. leaves
the term fixture "intensely undefined."' 32  Rather than define
fixture, section 9-313(l)(a) states that "goods are 'fixtures' when
they become so related to particular real estate that an interest in
them arises under real estate law."' 33 In light of the disarray of
state law defining fixtures, this definition is tantamount to no defi-
nition at all34 and is contrary to the express U.C.C. policy that the
commercial law in the states adoptin&4he Code be uniform.35
The decision to leave fixtures "intensely undefined"36 was
made only after two decades of experimentation and dissatisfac-
tion with various attempts at definition. The predecessor of article
9, Article 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA),37 dis-
carded the term fixture and spoke instead of "goods attached to
the realty. . . which can be removed without material injury to
the realty."33 Whether this vague test would have proven suitable
will not be known because few states enacted the UCSA, and
courts of those states which did adopt the Act interpreted it
nonuniformly. 39 General dissatisfaction with the UCSA and the
29. Id. § 9-313(5)(b).
30. Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Preliminary
Draft No. 2, reprintedin 25 Bus. LAW. 1067, 1072 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Review Com-
mittee for article 9].
31. U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(a).
32. Kripke, The Review Committee'r Proposals to Amend the Fixture Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 301, 304 (1969). Professor IK'ipke was an Asso-
ciate Reporter for the Review Committee.
33. U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(a).
34. See notes 64-85 infra and accompanying text.
35. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
36. Kripke, supra note 32, at 304.
37. UNIFORM CONDMONAL SALEs ACT § 7 (Act withdrawn 1952).
38. Id.
39. Kleps, Unirmity Versus Uniform Legislatiotn Condtional Mzle of Fixtures, 24
CORNELL L.Q. 394, 403-10 (1939). It should be noted, however, that the language of Arti-
cle 7 of the UCSA was adopted in the sales article of the U.C.C. in preference to the term
19811
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need for a comprehensive modem commercial code led to the
U.C.C.'s development in the late 1940's and early 1950's.10
Following the UCSA's example, early drafts of the U.C.C.
avoided the use of fixture and its common law interpretations.4'
During the revisions of the U.C.C. following its consideration by
the New York State Law Revision Commission in 1956, however,
the term was reintroduced without any apparent reason or con-
scious deliberation.42 The revised section read:
The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated
into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement,
glass, metal work and the like and no security interest in them
exists under this Article unless the structure remains personal
property under applicable law. The law of this state other than
this Act determines whether and when other goods become
fixtures. This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance
upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to
real estate.43
The 1962 and 1966 revisions of the Code left this definition
untouched.
Many commentators expressed dissatisfaction with this defini-
tion.44 The complaints focused on the Code's willing reference to
an obscure and inconsistent body of state law.45 Furthermore,
when adopting the pre-1972 versions of article 9 and section
9-313, some states riddled the U.C.C. fixture definition with
a myriad of nonuniform amendments.46 For example, Ohio47 and
fixture. U.C.C. § 2-107. The Official Comment notes that the term "fixture" was avoided
because "of the diverse definitions of this term." Id., Official Comment 2. The drafters of
article 9 recognized this discrepancy between the two articles: "Section 2-107 relates to
sale of such goods; Section 9-313 to security interests in them. The discrepancies between
the two sections arise from the differences in the types of interest covered." U.C.C.
§ 9-105, Official Comment 3. See Kock, Things Attached to Realty, 15 MERCER L. REv.
343 (1964).
40. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 3-4.
41. Coogan, The New UCCArticle 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 487 (1973). For a discus-
sion of the common law approach, see notes 64-85 infra and accompanying text.
42. Coogan, supra note 41, at 487. According to Coogan, the editorial board was "ap-
parently unaware of the reasons for [the term fixture's] rejection by their predecessors." Id.
43. U.C.C. § 9-313(1) (1966 version) (emphasis added).
44. See Coogan, Fixtures-Unformiy in Words or in Fact? 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1186
(1965); Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75
HARV. L. REv. 1319 (1962); Gilmore, The Furchase Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1333
(1963); Kripke, Fixtures Under Uniform Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44 (1964);
Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral A Proposed Solu-
tion to the Fixture Problem Under § 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964).
45. See notes 64-85 infra and accompanying text.
46. State legislatures have made more nonuniform changes in adopting article 9 than
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Florida,48  rewrote the fixture section to achieve priorities in
fixtures opposite from those prescribed by the drafters of the
Code,49 and California, fearful of adding further confusion to its
fixture law, deleted section 9-313.50 These actions were contrary
to the Code's express goal of establishing a simple, clear, and
modem law, uniform in all jurisdictions.'1
To remedy this situation, a Review Committee was appointed
to rewrite article 9.52 In its first proposed draft, the committee
attempted to more thoroughly define fixture by subjecting the ap-
plicable state definitions to a number of qualifications. 3 This
draft received a chorus of criticism as loud as that which had
prompted the initial revision. Some critics objected to the reten-
tion of the term fixture, 4 but a more general complaint was that
any other article of the U.C.C. Commercially significant states made 337 nonuniform
amendments by November, 1966. Coogan, supra note 41, at 479.
47. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.32 (Page 1979).
48. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-313 (West 1966).
49. These states, prior to the U.C.C., had adopted the minority rule that fixtures were
not a distinct class of property, but were chattels merged into the realty. See notes 78-82
infra and accompanying text. In these states, a finding that an object was a fixture gave the
real estate mortgagee priority because fixtures were realty. If these states had adopted
§ 9-313 as it was written, introducing a new class of fixture secured creditors, the interests
of real estate creditors would have been undermined. The legislatures of several states such
as Ohio, therefore, reversed the priority rules of§ 9-313 to continue to favor the real estate
mortgagee. See Nathan, Priorities in Fixture Collateral in Ohio: A Proposalfor Reform, 34
OHIO ST. L.. 719, 720 (1973). See also Gordon, supra note 10, at 661-65.
50. CAL. COM. CODE § 9313 (West 1964).
51. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
52. Although the fixture problem was not the only reason for the appointment of the
Review Committee, it was a major one. "Possibly no provision of the present Uniform
Commercial Code has generated as much dissatisfaction as section 9-313 concerning
fixtures." Bernstein & Fleischer, The Revisions of Article 9 of the Unform Commercial
Code: An Overview, 54 CHI. B. REc. 318, 319 (1973).
53. The proposal definition read:
Goods are "fixtures" when they are so related to particular real estate that under
the law of this state other than this Act an interest in the goods would pass as part
of the real estate under a conveyance or mortgage thereof without specific men-
tion of the goods, except as stated in this paragraph. Where ordinary building
materials are incorporated in an improvement upon land, which improvement is
itself not a fixture, the materials are real estate and not a fixture. An improve-
ment upon land is not a fixture unless it is readily removable from the land.
Readily removable factory and office machines, and readily removable replace-
ments of domestic appliances are not fixtures. Where the debtor is a tenant,
goods which he has a right to remove are not fixtures but are personal property.
Standing timber and growing crops and oil, gas and minerals before severance are
not fixtures.
First Report of the Review Committee for Article 9: Preliminary Draft No. 1, § 9-313
(1)(b)(i), reprinted in 24 Bus. LAw. 341, 344 (1969).
54. Henson, Fixtures: A Commentary on the Officially Proposed Changes in Article 9,
52 MARQ. L. REv. 179, 194-96 (1968). Henson was a member of the committee which
revised article 9.
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the attempted definition was too complicated to be practical."
The committee thus abandoned the proposal, recognizing that it
was "too complex, and most persons reading it do not understand
it.",56
The committee's second draft, subsequently adopted in the Of-
ficial 1972 version of the Code, again left the definitional problem
to the states.57 The various qualifications to the state definitions in
the first draft were incorporated by the second draft in special pri-
ority rules. 8 The U.C.C. thus recognized these special cases, such
as readily removable factory and office machines, as fixtures, but
exempted them from the general rules governing fixtures. As Pe-
ter Coogan, a consultant to the drafters of the new section stated,
"[w]e distinguish between what I might call soft fixtures and hard
fixtures. ' 59
Whether this change made the new section 9-313 less complex
and more understandable is unclear. The new definition parallels
the pre-1972 definition by leaving the determination of fixture to
state law and is subject, therefore, to the same criticisms.6 0 The
new definition accordingly has not resulted in greater uniformity.
Twenty-three jurisdictions simply have retained the pre-1972 ver-
sion and of the twenty-eight jurisdictions which have adopted the
1972 version, half of them have made nonuniform amendments to
section 9-313.61
New section 9-313 has not clarified when particular collateral
is a fixture. State law is no more consistent today than it was in
1966 when the committee began to revise article 9.62 In addition,
the new section presents further confusion by introducing unde-
fined terms such as "readily removable factory and office ma-
chines." 63 Thus, the use of the term fixture in article 9 is as
troublesome today as it was before the Review Committee first
met.
55. Leary & Rucci, Fixing Up the Fixture Section of the UCC, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 355, 371
n.39 (1969) (authors labeled the proposed definition a "monster").
56. Review Committee for Article 9, supra note 30, at 1072.
57. "[G]oods are 'fixtures' when they become so related to particular real estate that
an interest in them arises under real estate law." U.C.C. § 9-313(l)(a).
58. See notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
59. Panel- A Second Look at the Amendments to Article 9 of the Uniorn Commercial
Code, 29 Bus. LAW. 973, 983 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Panel].
60. Note, Making the UCC's Fixture Section More Workable, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 682,
688.
61. 3 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 5-6 (1981).
62. See notes 64-85 infra and accompanying text.
63. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c).
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II. THE COMMON LAW DEFINITION OF FIXTURE
Each state has a body of reported decisions distinguishing be-
tween chattels, fixtures, and realty in many contexts. These bodies
of law, however, often are perplexing, complicated, and inconsis-
tent.64 States disagree as to the tests to be applied in defining
fixtures and the status to be accorded fixtures. Even when there is
agreement as to the proper tests, the cases apply the tests
inconsistently.65
Property traditionally is classified as personalty, realty, or a
shadowy middle category called fixtures, which is chattel for some
purposes and realty for others.66 Land is realty and small items of
furniture are personalty. Objects such as built-in appliances, fur-
naces, and sinks generally are held to be fixtures. Although such
classification of property seems intuitively clear at the extremes,
judicial experience reveals ambiguity.
The extremes-a plot of land and a table-fall into two dis-
tinct property classifications, but the fixture classification is
blurred between the realty and personalty classifications. Fixtures
are objects so affixed to the realty that it seems odd to call them
personal property because they are not portable; yet, they also are
so ephemeral as compared to land that it is equally disquieting to
call them realty. A furnace, for example, either is cemented to the
floor or held in place by its own weight and has a useful life of
many years, but it nonetheless will wear out and have to be re-
placed several times during the useful life of the building in which
it is installed.
The tests applied to determine when a particular object is a
fixture vary among states. The cases reveal three general tests:
(1) the relative permanence of the attachment of the object to the
realty;67 (2) the adaptation of the chattel to the use being made of
the realty;68 and (3) the intentions of the various interested parties
64. "Every lawyer knows that cases can be found in this field that will support any
position that the facts of his particular case require him to take.. .. 'There is a wilderness
of authority on this question of fixtures. .. ." Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 695, 172
P.2d 216,218 (1946), (quoting Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Miller, 20 Wash. 607,
56 P. 382 (1899)).
65. 1 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF PROPERTY 237-38
(repl. 1980).
66. Id. at 178-87.
67. See, ag., Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Ryan, 165 Md. 484, 169
A. 794 (1934); Premonstratensian Fathers v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Wis. 2d 362, 175
N.W.2d 237 (1970).
68. See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Jefferson County Bd. of Revision, 27
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to make a permanent addition to the land.69 The amount of dam-
age which the realty would incur by the removal of the chattel
also is considered.7" This last factor generally is not considered to
be a separate test but is a factor to be considered in connection
with one or more of the three general tests.7'
The applicability of these tests and the relative weight each is
given varies among states and cases. The earlier cases emphasized
attachment, either actual or constructive, while the more recent
cases emphasize the intent of the owner or affixer of the fixture.72
Often courts refer to all three tests in deciding a particular case. 73
Because the tests are vague and inconsistently applied, the results
are contradictory. 74
Applying these tests to the furnace example, it is not clear that
a furnace is either personal property or part of the realty. To the
extent that the furnace can be dismantled readily and moved to
another building, it is a chattel.75 Indeed, the furnace may be eas-
ier to move than a grand piano. The furnace, however, may be so
integral to the building that it becomes part of the realty. During
the winter months, a furnace may be indispensable, and the value
of the building may be diminished appreciably if it cannot be
heated.76 Finally, although a furnace could be moved to another
building, the owner almost always intends to make the furnace a
permanent part of the building in which it was installed originally.
Prospective buyers, when inspecting the property, might ask about
the condition of the furnace, but they rarely would ask if the fur-
nace is included in the price of the property. The treatment of the
Ohio St. 2d 45, 271 N.E.2d 861 (1971); Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16
S.E.2d 345 (1941).
69. See, e.g., Del-Tan Corp. v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 269 A.2d 209 (Del. 1970);
Rowlen v. Hermann, 129 Ill. App. 2d 45, 262 N.E.2d 739 (1970).
70. See, e.g., Della Corp. v. Diamond, 58 Del. 465, 210 A.2d 847 (1965).
71. Moler-Vandenboom Lumber Co. v. Boudreau, 231 Mo. App. 1127, 85 S.W.2d
141 (1935).
72. 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 65, at 187-92.
73. See, e.g., Coming Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949 (1979).
74. See Abramson v. Penn, 156 Md. 186, 143 A. 795 (1928). A4bramson, emphasizing
the annexation test, ruled that gas radiators held in place by their own weight are not
fixtures. In XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56
Ohio App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937), the court, emphasizing the adaptation test, held that
a furnace not physically attached to the building was a fixture because Ohio's climate made
it indispensible to the building's use.
75. Gar Wood Indus., Inc. v. Colonial Homes, Inc., 305 Mass. 41, 24 N.E.2d 767
(1940).
76. XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio
App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937).
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furnace as permanent by the parties involved may result in the
furnace being classified as a fixture.7 7
The status of fixtures also varies among states. The majority
rule recognizes the tripartite classification of property as being ei-
ther personalty, realty, or fixtures.7 8 Fixtures, although a hybrid,
represent a distinct class.7 9 The well established minority posi-
tion, taken by Ohio and Massachusetts, asserts that fixtures are
chattels which have been merged into the realty and, therefore,
are realty.8" The U.C.C. purported to leave the definition of
fixture to the states, but by treating fixtures and other chattels as
separate classes of collateral, the Code adopted the majority posi-
tion.81 This stance left the minority states in an anomalous posi-
tion and led to nonuniformity in the versions of the U.C.C.
adopted by several states.82
Special doctrines unique to certain states, such as Penn-
sylvania's Assembled Industrial Plant doctrine, add to the confu-
sion. This doctrine, an exaggerated form of the adaptation of the
chattel to the realty test, states that all machinery and equipment
necessary to the functioning of a particular factory are factory
fixtures.8 3 Thus, empty beer kegs awaiting refilling at a brewery
are fixtures.' The disparate tests developed by the common law
to define fixtures, and the contradictory results to which they give
rise, has led one commentator to remark that "[tihe law is said to
be a seamless web, but the problem of fixtures can only be called a
77. See West v. Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Iowa 147, 90 N.W. 523 (1902).
78. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
79. Berry, Priority Conflicts Between Fixture Secured Creditors and Real Estate Claim-
ants, 7 MEM. ST. L. REV. 209, 210-12 (1977).
80. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1852).
81. This position is described in U.C.C. § 9-313, Official Comment 3:
Under these concepts the section recognizes three categories of goods: (1) those
which retain their chattel character entirely and are not part of the real estate;
(2) ordinary building materials which have become an integral part of the real
estate and cannot retain their chattel character for purposes of finance; and (3) an
intermediate class which has become real estate for certain purposes, but as to
which chattel financing may be preserved. This third and intermediate class is the
primary subject of this section. The demarcation between these classifications is
not dilineated by this section.
82. See Hollander, Impefections in Perfection o Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 W. REs. L.
REv. 683, 684-87 (1963); Nathan, supra note 49, at 720.
83. 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 65, at 241.
84. First Nat'l Bank v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277 (1952). Frozen food
display cabinets in a grocery, however, are not fixtures because a grocery is characterized
by its merchandise, not its machinery. In re Kann, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 622 (E.D. Pa.
1969).
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tangled web."85
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE FIxTuRE PROBLEM
Three broad solutions have been suggested to correct the defi-
nitional problem of fixture as used in article 9. The first solution
proposes that since the definitional problem has limited practical
effect, less credence should be given to academic criticism.8 6 The
second solution proposes that the U.C.C. adopt a definition which
would supersede the common law definition for the purposes of
article 9.87 The third solution proposes that because no workable
definition of fixture can be devised, the U.C.C. should be rewrit-
ten to eliminate the need to distinguish fixtures.88 This Note will
examine each of these proposed solutions.
A. Is the Problem Illusory?
Some commentators argue that criticisms which declare state
law fixture definitions too confusing to be incorporated into the
U.C.C. are academic because the definitions are not troublesome
in actual practice.89 In many cases, a given collateral is obviously
a fixture.90 Where it is doubtful how the collateral should be clas-
sified, creditors can, and in practice do, file their security interests
both as ordinary goods and as fixtures.91
In most cases the definition of fixture, or the absence of such a
definition, is not troublesome. 92 The relative infrequency of re-
85. Kripke, supra note 44, at 51.
86. Leary & Rucci, supra note 55, at 364-73; Panel, supra note 59, at 987 (comments
of Homer Kripke).
87. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Un/form Commercial Code, supra
note 44, at 1225. See notes 99-127 infra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 128-46 infra and accompanying text.
89. Leary & Rucci, supra note 55, at 364-73; Panel, supra note 59, at 987 (comments
of Homer Kripke).
90. Leary & Rucci, supra note 55, at 365 n.23.
91. Bernstein, Another Look at the Article 9 Revisions-Some Specofc Problems, 57
Cmi. B. REc. 289, 295 (1976). Bernstein, however, suggests that the new § 9-313 may be
interpreted to forbid such precautionary duplicate filings because of the requirement of
§ 9-402(5) that a fixture filing state that the collateral is a fixture. Id. But see U.C.C.
§ 9-313, Official Comment 1: "[N]o inference may be drawn from a fixture filing that the
secured party concedes that the goods are or will become fixtures. The fixture filing may be
merely precautionary." Id.
92. See Coogan, supra note 41, at 487:
The demand for improvement in article 9 did not come primarily from a spate of
court cases, but rather as a result of further thinking on the part of that segment of
the bar and the teaching profession whose business it is to anticipate what courts
will do when such cases arise.
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ported cases where unclear definitions cause expectations to be de-
feated does not necessarily mean, however, that the definition of
fixture is not problematic. The typical problem case involves a
conflict between a fixture secured creditor and a mortgagee where
the buyer of the fixture defaults on his or her fixture payments. 93
In the past few decades, inflation may have masked conflicts be-
tween the two interests, since appreciated real estate provides
enough equity to satisfy both claimants.94 A decline or leveling in
real estate values, however, could revive conflicts between fixture
secured creditors and mortgagees. This possibility of conflict has
led Professor Gilmore to suggest that not until "we suffer another
collapse on a scale that took place in the late 1920's and early
1930's" 95 will the definition of fixture assume a sense of urgency.
The mere fact that there are separate filing requirements and
priority rules for fixtures and other goods96 is both a burden on
creditors and a trap for the unwary. If the creditor recognizes the
problem, he or she can resort to time consuming and expensive
multiple filings.97 If, however, the creditor is not aware of the
problem of defining fixture, costly litigation may result.98 When
the line between fixtures and goods is as shadowy as it is, the trap
becomes more intolerable.
B. Proposed Defnitions
The drafters of section 9-313 did not provide a concrete defini-
tion of fixture in article 9 because they perceived, that any such
definition would be problematic. If the definition purported to
apply to all situations, then what was intended to be solely a com-
mercial code also would alter state real estate law.99 If, however,
the definition was limited to U.C.C. applications, each state would
have one definition of fixture for Code purposes and another for
real estate situations. This situation would result in conflicts
between fixture secured creditors and mortgagees which the Code
could not resolve.1°° To avoid this dilemma, the U.C.C. incorpo-
93. Gordon, supra note 10, at 655.
94. Shanker, supra note 44, at 792.
95. Panel- A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee, reprinted in 26 Bus.
LAW. 307, 316 (1970); See Coogan, supra note 41, at 482-83.
96. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text.
97. Note, Toward a Satifactory Fixture Definition for the Uniform Commercial Code,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 482 (1970).
98. Id. at 482-83.
99. Kripke, supra note 32, at 304.
100. Id.
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rated each state's common law fixture definition.' 0'
Several writers, apparently minimizing the importance of this
dilemma, have tried to draft definitions of fixture for article 9. An
early attempt at drafting such a definition was made by Peter Coo-
gan.10 2 Coogan proposed the following recommendations:
First, it should provide that all determinations as to whether
goods remain chattels, become fixtures, or become realty be
made by the court and not by the jury. Second, it should make
clear that incorporation into a structure is the only manner in
which goods may become realty. Third, it should provide that
goods do not become fixtures unless they are affixed to the re-
alty in some substantial way-certainly more substantially than
by a simple electric cord or garden hose connection. Fourth, it
should make clear. . . that goods have not become real estate
merely because their removal would cause economic loss to the
freehold. l03
In several respects this proposal does not improve the existing
provisions of article 9. First, the provision for judicial determina-
tion of fixtures, alone, is not helpful. The question of whether
something is a fixture generally is a mixed one of law and fact, t04
and appellate courts have had no success developing a consistent
rule for spotting fixtures.' 05 Second, the requirement stating that
only goods incorporated into a structure become realty is not help-
ful when the issue is whether the structure itself, such as a prefab-
ricated farm silo, is a fixture.'06 Third, the provision requiring
that the collateral be affixed in "some substantial way" is not any
clearer than the present "attachment" test. 07 Coogan concludes
that the only safe course is to exercise an abundance of caution. If
creditors are unsure whether their collateral is a fixture, they
should perfect their security interest both as a chattel and as a
101. Id.
102. Mr. Coogan subsequently served as a consultant to the Review Committee which
wrote the 1972 version of article 9.
103. Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, supra
note 44, at 1348. See Coogan, Fixture-Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, supra note 44, at
1226-27 (elaboration of original proposal).
104. See e.g., Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Sawyer, 26 Ala. App. 520, 163 So. 657
(1935).
105. See notes 64-85 supra and accompanying text.
106. See e.g., Coming Bank v. Bank of Rector, 265 Ark. 68, 576 S.W.2d 949 (1979).
Corning Bank applied the annexation, adaptation, and intention tests, to uphold a finding
that grain storage bins were fixtures. The bins took three days to erect and were bolted to
concrete foundations but they could be unbolted and hauled away, leaving behind the
foundations.
107. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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fixture.10 8
Another proposal suggests that the term fixture be replaced by
a new term of art based on the manner in which the chattel is
attached to the realty. 09 Collateral attached by means of nails,
screws, bolts or "a material having a bonding strength equal" to
such fasteners would be considered a fixture." 0 This definition,
however, is underinclusive since much machinery and equipment
which is integral to real estate, although not actually nailed down,
would not be fixtures."' Moreover, the modem trend has been to
depart from strict requirements of attachment. An item generally
is considered to be a fixture if it is related integrally to the realty
and the owner intends it to be a fixture." 2 A fixture definition
based on physical attachment is also overinclusive since many ob-
jects not considered to be fixtures even though screwed down
would be recognized as fixtures. 1 3 Thus, the proposed definition
oversimplifies the problem by focusing only on attachment-a
factor the courts already consider in determining whether goods
are fixtures."14
Professor Nathan suggests a more sophisticated, two-part test,
which recognizes objects as fixtures regardless of whether they ac-
tually are attached.' 1 5 Nathan's definition would apply not only
108. Coogan, Securily Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, supra
note 44, at 1379.
109. See, e.g., Note, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-313: Timefor Adoption in Calfor-
nia, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 235 (1975).
110. Id. at 263.
111. See XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56
Ohio App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937). XXth Century held that a furnace is a fixture of a
dwelling house, even though it is not attached to the dwelling house, because the climate
makes the furnace indispensible to the building's use. Id.
112. See, e.g., Cherokee Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Manly Jail Works, Inc., 257 Ark. 1041,
1043, 521 S.W.2d 528, 530 (1975); Alwes v. Richheimer, 185 Ark. 535, 538-39, 47 S.W.2d
1084, 1085 (1932).
113. The intention of the parties and the fact that the object can be removed without
damage to the building may result in machinery being held to be personal property, despite
the fact that it is bolted down and connected to plumbing and electrical lines. See, e.g., In
re Nelson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 854 (D. Utah 1969); In re Kahl, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1322
(W.D. Wis. 1972).
114. Dissatisfaction with this definition has led one group of commentators to remark,
"[u]nder this formula anything which could be moved more than a half inch by 6--1ow
with a hammer weighing not more than five pounds and swung by a man weighing not
more than 250 pounds would not be a fixture." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at
1056 n.66.
115. Goods are fixtures:
(i) when the goods are physically attached to realty in such a way that their re-
moval will result in substantial injury to the goods or to the real estate (apart from
diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods or any
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to article 9 situations, but also to all real estate conveyancing situ-
ations. This expansion into real estate law, however, contravenes
the U.C.C.'s original attempt to avoid infringing on state property
law.I1 6 Professor Nathan justifies this intrusion by arguing that
real estate law and article 9 are "inextricably intertwined." 1 7 The
proposed definition also does no more than codify several of the
common law tests already used to determine whether goods are
fixtures-the intent of the person making the affixation and the
adaptation of the fixture to the realty. In addition, the new defini-
tion gives limited guidance to the courts on the proper application
of the test, thereby sacrificing uniformity.
The judiciary has recognized that the term fixture cannot be
defined concretely because fixture is a label applied to a conclu-
sion of law, not a category of actually existing objects. 1 8 In the
leading American fixture case, Teaff v. Hewitt," 9 the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that property was either personalty or realty,
because fixtures, as a category of property, do not exist. 120 The
court in Teaff stated the minority position, however, and most
states try to define fixtures as though fixtures exist as a distinct
category of property.' 2' If the courts are unable to articulate the
boundaries of the fixture definition, they apply or withhold the
fixture label in accordance with equitable principles. 22 Thus,
where disputes arise between landlords and tenants as to the own-
ership of the fixtures which the tenant installed, the courts, favor-
ing the tenant, apply more liberal rules than where the dispute
is between a mortgagor or a fixture secured creditor and a
mortgagee. 23
need to replace them); or (ii) when the goods, whether or not they are physically
attached to the realty, are so necessary to the functioning, use or enjoyment of the
realty itself (as distinguished from a particular business or activity conducted
thereon) that they may be regarded reasonably as having been intended by the
affixor [sic] or owner to be permanent additions to the realty.
Nathan, supra note 49, at 747.
116. U.C.C. § 9-1040).
117. Although the proposed definition would apply to conveyancing, it would not ap-
ply to other real estate applications, such as valuation for taxation. Nathan, supra note 49,
at 748.
118. Coogan, Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or in Fact?, supra note 44, at 1220-21;
Cosway, Fixtures Under the Unform Commercial Code, 21 Sw. L.J. 713, 713 (1967).
119. 1 Ohio St. 511, 524-27 (1853).
120. Id.
121. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text.
122. See Cosway, supra note 118, at 713.
123. Empire Bldg. Corp. v. Orput & Assocs., Inc., 32 Ill. App. 3d 839, 841, 336 N.E.2d
82, 84 (1975); Ilderton Oil Co. v. Riggs, 13 N.C. App. 547, 549, 186 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1972).
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The attempt to define fixture actually inhibits the development
of priority rules for creditors with conflicting claims to the same
collateral. The priority rules of section 9-313, for example, are
cluttered with several qualifications to the general fixture defini-
tion.' 24 The law of secured transactions is not concerned with the
definition of fixture, but with when a fixture filing is required to
perfect a security interest in a particular object 25 and when the
security interest in that object will have priority over other credi-
tors. 126 The effort to define fixture is actually an effort to deter-
mine the applicability of the special rules of section 9-313. There
would be no need for a Code reference to fixtures if the perfection
requirements and priority rules for fixtures and goods were the
same. The question whether an object is a fixture would become
"unimportant; at most it would be an academic problem, but not a
practical one."' 127
C. Secured Transactions Without Fixtures
If the same perfection and priority rules can be applied to both
fixtures and other goods under article 9, the need to distinguish
fixtures from goods can be eliminated. Whether the same rules
can be applied depends on reconciliation of the policies behind
the separate rules. This reconciliation involves a balancing of the
interests of real estate mortgagees with the interests of secured
creditors. 28
The conflict between the interests of the secured creditor and
the mortgagee is exemplified by the filing requirements for perfec-
tion of a security interest. The filing requirements, designed to
ensure that potential real estate mortgagees are given notice of
prior interests in the putative collateral, advance the principle that
prior interests about which a creditor reasonably could have
known are superior to the creditor's interest. 129 Giving notice to
potential mortgagees, however, must be weighed against the bur-
den placed on those parties expected to give notice. Included in
the formula is the possibility that those parties expected to give
notice will be left unsecured for unintentionally failing to give
124. See notes 27-31 supra-and accompanying text,
125. Headrick, The New Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: An Introduction
and Critique, 34 MONT. L. REV. 28, 48 (1973).
126. Cosway, supra note 118, at 715.
127. Shanker, supra note 44, at 795.
128. Henson, supra note 54, at 195.
129. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 918-19.
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notice. 130
There are three possible ways of alleviating the conflict be-
tween mortgagees and secured creditors. One possible solution
would require the perfection of all security interests by filing in
the state real estate records. If this filing were done, classifying a
collateral as a fixture would be unnecessary because the mortga-
gee would be on notice. This requirement would benefit the
holder of the real estate interest by giving that person notice of
every conflicting fixture interest. One commentator notes that
such a rule would "clutter the real estate records with a jumble of
information, most of which would have no connection whatsoever
with real estate titles."'' A second possible solution to the con-
flict between mortgagees and secured creditors would require all
security interests in any property under article 9 be perfected by
filing in one chattel file. The mortgagee would be deemed to have
constructive notice of the file. This alternative was rejected be-
cause it overburdened land title searchers. 132 The third possible
solution would require that some article 9 collateral be perfected
by filing in the real estate records and the balance be perfected by
filing in the separate chattel files.
The U.C.C. adopted the third alternative and, therefore,
fixture in article 9 designates collateral perfected by filing in the
real estate records which would otherwise be considered chat-
tels. 133 The drafters' decision to require the filing of fixture secur-
ity interests in the local real estate records necessarily implies that
they thought the need to give notice to potential mortgagees out-
weighed the filing burden to fixture secured creditors when the
chattel is so closely related to the real estate that the mortgagee
might think his or her mortgage was secured in part by the chat-
tel. 13  Section 9-313's exceptions for factory and office ma-
chines, 35 however, relieve the fixture secured creditor of the filing
burden where "no rational real estate lender would rely upon such
collateral .. 136
Fixture secured creditors must protect themselves from the
possibility that their collateral will be classified as a chattel by
130. Kripke, supra note 32, at 305-06. See also Gordon, supra note 10.
131. Shanker, supra note 44, at 796.
132. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 817 (1965).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 817-18.
135. U.C.C. §§ 9-313(4)(c), (d), -313(5).
136. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 1060.
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perfecting their security interest against other chattel secured cred-
itors. The "workable compromise" on the real estate fixture filing
consequently entails a duplicate filing for fixtures that might be
chattels, thereby creating a potential trap for the unwary creditor
who fails to make duplicate filings.
The fixture problem could be eliminated entirely by aban-
doning the tripartite classification of property. 37 A member of
the article 9 Review Committee noted that "there is no compelling
reason for recognizing [fixtures as a] special category of goods; the
only excuse for it is historical."'' 38 Under this proposal, the fixture
secured party, like the chattel secured party, needs to make only
one filing in the chattel records. This unification eliminates the
possibility of unwary creditors finding themselves unsecured when
a fixture is classified later as a chattel.
This proposal appears to disfavor the real estate mortgagee.
The mortgagee would be forced to search both the chattel and the
real estate files or risk the possibility that an element of the prop-
erty on which he or she extended a loan, such as a furnace, is
already encumbered. 39 This argument, however, fails on several
grounds. No real estate recording system ever shows all encum-
brances upon real estate, such that mortgagees always have to
search beyond the real estate records. 140 The added burden of
checking the chattel records is not inordinate. Indeed, the re-
quirement that fixture filings be made in the real estate records
merely is indicative of the political strength of the real estate bar,
not the logic of its position. 141 One commentator noted, "[M]any
demands of mortgagees are politically and economically unrealis-
tic . . ,142
Arguments can be made for favoring either the chattel secured
financer or the real estate mortgagee. Fixture financing is usually
short-term and for the fixture's purchase price. Encouraging such
financing will further the goal of modernizing the nation's hous-
ing.' 43 Real estate mortgagees, on the other hand, make the wide-
137. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
138. Henson, supra note 54, at 195.
139. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
140. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 132, at 817; Creedon, Some Reactions to the Review
Commfttee's Proposal to .4mend the Fixture Provisions of the Code, 25 Bus. LAW. 313, 317
(1969).
141. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 132, at 817.
142. Henson, supra note 54, at 196.
143. Lloyd, Proposed Revisions of/the UCC Seek Uniformity on Fixtures, 2 REAL EST.
L.. 444, 460 (1973).
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spread ownership of private homes possible, and public policy
should aim to keep home mortgages safe and dependable invest-
ments.'" These competing demands of the chattel secured credi-
tor and the real estate mortgagee should be adjusted through clear
rules of priority, however, and not through subterfuges of defini-
tional terms. 145 Vaguely defined terms such as fixture should not
be employed to avoid the resolution of such competing interests,
especially where the vagueness of terms can result in confusion
and injustice. By eliminating the definitional question, the legisla-
ture would be forced to confront the real issue: Who should be
favored when two creditors extend credit on the same
collateral? 146
IV. CONCLUSION
Article 9 makes important distinctions in the perfection of se-
curity interest requirements and priority rules dependent on
whether the collateral is a fixture.147 Section 9-313, however, does
not define fixture-it merely refers the creditor to non-Code state
law.148 Thus, the creditor is faced with a body of confused and
nonuniform common law. 14 9  Consequently, the creditor ex-
tending credit on collateral which arguably might be a chattel or a
fixture must make duplicate filings or risk losing his security
preference.150
To remedy this situation, some commentators suggest that a
uniform definition of fixture be adopted. 15  The details of such a
definition, however, lose their merit under scrutiny and ultimately
fail because the problem goes beyond the semantics of defining
fixture to the priority conflict among competing creditor's
144. Prather, A Savings Association View of the Review Committee's Proposals, 25 Bus.
LAW. 327, 327-28 (1969).
145. Henson, supra note 54, at 195-96. Henson's proposed priority rule, for example,
provides that a creditor who had a perfected purchase money security interest would pre-
vail over a mortgagee if the debtor had a recorded interest in the real estate. In all other
cases, the mortgagee would prevail. Henson notes that "this would leave a certain number
of problems to the economic realities of individual situations." Id.
146. It is interesting to note that the drafters of the 1972 version of § 9-313 made an
initial step in this direction by qualifying the definition of fixture in § 9-313(l)(a) with
special priority rules, such as the one for office and factory machines in § 9-313(4)(c). See
notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 64-85 supra and accompanying text.
150. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 103-17 supra and accompanying text.
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claims.15 2
The best solution would be for commercial law to abandon the
unworkable and unnecessary concept of fixture.1 53 Commercial
law should, instead, focus on establishing priorities between chat-
tel secured creditors and real estate mortgagees. When this prior-
ity issue is sublimated to the determination of a fixture definition,
fixture secured financing is confused with obsolete common law
distinctions.1 54  This confusion forces courts to make ad hoc
fixture determinations based on equitable principles. 15 The
weighing of the policies behind this ad hoc decisionmaking should
be done initially by the legislature and not be left to the uncertain-
ties of litigation.
DAVID JOSEPH SOMRAK
152. See notes 118-23 supra and accompanying text.
153. See notes 128-46 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Henson, supra note 54, at 180:
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code brought about a renaissance of
learning in the field of fixture law.... This meant that lawyers learned old-
fashioned fixture law at precisely the time when its importance reached its nadir.
However, since fixture law was, generally speaking, purely common law in most
of the United States, the Code's enactment provided an opportunity for endless
discussions and often heated arguments which everyone or anyone could win
since no one could provide definitive answers for some of the most elementary
questions.
Id.
155. See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
